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I. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitrators are diverse, independent, and hold resolutely different 
opinions, but in the world of investor-State disputes arbitrators are 
often viewed as a kind of closet oligarchy, a conclave of the 
powerful concealing their power under the veil of practice and the 
modalities of an arbitral profession that is actually of rather recent 
origin. The growth of investment treaty arbitration in recent decades 
has been met with a wave of criticism, calling into question not only 
the arbitrator’s technical abilities but also his or her ethics. The 
criticisms levelled against arbitrators in investor-State disputes are 
not made against arbitrators in international commercial arbitration, 
or at least not with the same frequency and vigor. There are 
suggestions, for example, that it is unethical to act both as arbitrator 
and counsel, even in unrelated investment disputes. This proposition 
does not seem to trouble international commercial arbitrators and, if 
taken literally, would make it more difficult to create the second 
generation of investment arbitrators. There are also cries for 
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transparency and greater publicity, including third party intervention: 
again, this is not a critique made of international commercial 
arbitrators. Further, there are demands for appellate mechanisms and 
for an international investment court system (with its own court of 
appeal). In contrast, finality is seen as a core attribute of international 
commercial arbitration. 
This outpouring of concern over the arbitrator has not been, for the 
most part, triggered by the performance of arbitrators in any given 
case. It is not a consequence of malfeasance. Rather it has been a 
reaction to a perceived lack of accountability associated with an 
exaggerated image of the arbitrator’s decisional power. Many are 
uncomfortable that investors can sue States on matters implicating 
the public interest and that States’ liabilities are determined by party-
appointed arbitrators pursuant to secretive rules imported from 
international contract disputes. 
This sentiment was captured by Joost Pauwelyn: 
ISDS is in a state of crisis in many parts of the world, and much of the 
criticism is focused precisely on who is deciding ISDS cases. The 
investment regime is said to be governed by arbitrators, rather than states. 
Arbitrators are labelled as “private judges” operating in secrecy, biased in 
favor of large multinationals, without regard to conflicts of interest and 
issuing inconsistent decisions. . .the world investment regime seems, at 
present, to have too much rule of lawyers and not enough rule of law.1 
This article will focus on the expansion of expectations of the 
arbitrator in the cognate fields of international commercial arbitration 
and investment treaty arbitration. The false premise that there is an 
ideal arbitrator for all situations – a sort of “perfect arbitral being” – 
provides a launching pad to discuss what skills and qualities are 
demanded of the arbitrator in the more or less contentious arena of 
international arbitration, and for exploring current proposals, such as 
the European Union’s (EU) investment court system. 
Before proceeding, it is helpful to briefly revisit what is meant by 
“international commercial arbitration” on the one hand and 
“investment treaty arbitration” on the other. International commercial 
 1.  Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers? Why 
Investment Arbitrators are from Mars, Trade Adjudicators are from Venus, 109(4) 
AM. J. INT’L L. 761, 764 (2015). 
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arbitration is conducted between parties from different States, 
usually private parties, usually pursuant to arbitral rules incorporated 
into a prior contract between the parties.2 Investment arbitration is 
conducted between a foreign investor and a host State in which the 
investment is located, usually pursuant to a dispute resolution clause 
in a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty, with the claimant’s 
choice of forum being made ad hoc, after the underlying dispute has 
arisen.3 The two fields overlap and have always overlapped. 
Commercial arbitrators pioneered the investment arbitration system 
at a point in time when it was thought that most disputes would arise 
under contracts between investors and governments, rather than 
under multilateral or bilateral treaties. And commercial arbitrators 
remain among the ranks of the leading investment treaty arbitrators. 
The notion of the “ideal arbitrator” draws inspiration from Yves 
Dezalay and Bryant Garth’s historical conception of commercial 
arbitrators as a closed group of “Grand Old Men”4 – lawyers of 
distinction, trusted for their wisdom and judgment, although not 
arbitration specialists. Dezalay and Garth pinpointed a second 
generation of arbitrators, who they rather unhappily labelled the 
“Technocrats.”5 These were expert arbitration practitioners who had 
spent their entire careers working in the field. In 2012, Thomas 
Schultz and Robert Kovacs revisited Dezalay and Garth’s 
sociological study and added a third generation of arbitrators, whom 
they called the “Managers.”6 These were arbitrators highly skilled at 
managing proceedings, deliberations and the organisation of tribunal 
work.7 
These generations raise three potential dimensions of the ideal 
 2.  See General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1816-17 (1987-88). 
 3.  JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
741 (8th ed. 2012). 
 4.  YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 34 (1996). 
 5.  Id. at 34, 36.  
 6.  Thomas Schultz & Robert Kovacs, The Rise of a Third Generation of 
Arbitrators? Fifteen Years After Dezalay and Garth, 28 ARBITRATION INT’L 161, 
170-71 (2012) (describing the results of a study that revealed strong management 
abilities to be the “single most important attribute” in appointing an arbitrator).   
 7.  See id.  
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arbitrator on which this article will focus – first, impartiality and 
independence; second, technical expertise; and third, procedural and 
managerial expertise. 
II. THE GRAND OLD MEN 
The first thing to note about the Grand Old Men is that the use of 
“men” in the descriptor was not a sexist slip by Dezalay and Garth. 
This generation of arbitrators were all men and unfortunately things 
have not improved much in this regard.8 In 2014, the number of 
women appointed in London Court of International Arbitration 
(LCIA) disputes was 13 percent; only 5.6 percent of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) appointees 
were female.9 
In the commercial arbitration context, the Grand Old Men were 
those who had risen to the top of their domestic legal professions, but 
who had not specialised in arbitration. They included leading 
professors, judges of superior courts, senior barristers, and certain 
heads of major law firms.10 The unifying characteristic of the Grand 
Old Men was that they had “symbolic capital:”11 their professional 
office, political standing, and social prestige served as a guarantee of 
their independence and impartiality. Nowadays, in both investment 
treaty arbitration and international commercial arbitration, this 
guarantee vests less in the arbitrator’s personal reputation and more 
in the applicable arbitration rules. 
The standard language in arbitration rules is that of 
“independence” and “impartiality”. This language was originally 
included in the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) Rules12 and has now made its way into the 
arbitration rules of the LCIA,13 the International Chamber of 
 8.  See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 249 n.61 (6th ed. 2015) (highlighting the dearth of women among 
the ranks of international arbitrators). 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 4, at 18-19.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 10, U.N. Doc. 
A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules]. 
 13.  London Court of International Arbitration Rules, art. 5.3 (2014) 
[hereinafter LCIA Rules]. 
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Commerce (ICC),14 the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)15 
and the American Arbitration Association (AAA),16 among others. It 
should be noted that the situation in the international rules of the 
AAA is quite different from that in the domestic rules, under which 
parties may agree that party-appointed arbitrators be non-neutral.17 
As for the ICSID Convention, it requires arbitrators who, among 
other things “may be relied upon to exercise independent 
judgment.”18 The Convention makes no mention of the word 
“impartial.” However, ICSID does list a set of additional 
considerations for selecting arbitrators on its website, one of which is 
the “[a]bsence of a conflict of interest.”19 
What do the terms “independence” and “impartiality” mean in the 
context of arbitration? The rules provide limited guidance. In Article 
5.3 of the LCIA Rules, the stipulation that arbitrators be independent 
and impartial is followed by the words “and none shall act in the 
arbitration as advocate for or representative of any party.”20 These 
two concepts are separated by a semicolon, suggesting that acting as 
an advocate or representative of a party would be an incidence of 
non-independence or partiality. The final sentence of Article 5.3 
stipulates that “[n]o arbitrator shall advise any party on the parties’ 
dispute or the outcome of the arbitration.”21 Similarly, Article 13(6) 
of the AAA Rules forbids ex parte communication between the 
arbitrator and his or her appointing party in relation to the case.22 In 
 14.  International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration, art. 11(1) 
(2012) [hereinafter ICC Rules]. 
 15.  Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce, art. 18(1) (2017) [hereinafter 2017 SCC Rules].  
 16.  American Arbitration Association International Arbitration Rules, art. 
13(1) (2014) [hereinafter AAA Int’l Rules]. 
 17.  American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rules and 
Mediation Procedures, Rule 18(b) (2013) [hereinafter AAA Domestic Rules]. 
 18.  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, art. 14(1), 40(2), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].  
 19.  Selection and Appointment of Tribunal Members - Additional Facility 
Arbitration, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Selection-and-
Appointment-of-Tribunal-Members-(Additional-Facility-Arbitration).aspx (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Selection and Appointment of Tribunal 
Members]. 
 20.  LCIA Rules, supra note 13, art 5.3. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  AAA Int’l Rules, art. 13(6) (providing only a narrow allowance for 
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sum, the only guidance provided by the rules is that arbitrators shall 
not assume the role of counsel or adviser for a party, which one 
would have thought was fairly self-evident. 
Some guidance on the meaning of “impartiality” and 
“independence” may be found in the 2014 IBA Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, which are aimed at 
both international commercial arbitrators and investment treaty 
arbitrators.23 Helpfully, the guidelines provide some practical 
examples of potential conflicts, which are attributed a red, orange, or 
green colour tag based on their level of severity and whether or not 
they are able to be waived by the agreement of the parties.24 An 
example from the Red List is where “the arbitrator or his or her firm 
regularly advises the party, or an affiliate of the party, and the 
arbitrator or his or her firm derives significant financial income 
therefrom.”25 Cases on the Orange List include circumstances where 
“the arbitrator has, within the past three years, served as counsel 
against one of the parties, or an affiliate of one of the parties, in an 
unrelated matter”, or where “[e]nmity exists between an arbitrator 
and counsel appearing in the arbitration.”26 An example from the 
Green List is where “the arbitrator has previously expressed a legal 
opinion (such as in a law review article or public lecture) concerning 
an issue that also arises in the arbitration (but this opinion is not 
focused on the case).”27 
Of equal importance to the meaning of “independence” and 
“impartiality” is the threshold for disqualification and the standard of 
proof that needs to be met by the party complaining of bias. Under 
the UNCITRAL Rules and the rules of the LCIA, SCC, and AAA, 
parties are permitted to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator 
where “circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to 
that arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.”28 Article 57 of the 
communications regarding the general nature of the case and the individual’s 
qualifications to serve on the panel). 
 23.  International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration, Introduction, (2014) [hereinafter IBA Guidelines]. 
 24.  Id. at Part II, ¶¶ 1-3, 7.  
 25.  Id. at Part II, §1, ¶ 1.4. 
 26.  Id. at Part II, §3, ¶¶ 3.1.2, 3.3.7. 
 27.  Id. at Part II, §4, ¶ 4.1.1. 
 28.  U.N. Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 
68/109, art. 12, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/68/462 (Dec. 16, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 
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ICSID Convention, by contrast, only allows for disqualification “on 
account of any fact indicating a manifest lack of the qualities 
required by paragraph 1 of Article 14,” which includes reliability “to 
exercise independent judgment.”29 The relationship between Articles 
57 and 14 has generated some uncertainty as to the applicable test in 
ICSID disqualification proceedings. Will an arbitrator be disqualified 
if there is reasonable doubt as to his or her independence, or does 
there need to be a manifest lack of independence? Does “manifest” 
mean that there must be clear evidence of impropriety or does it go 
to the degree of the arbitrator’s reliability to act independently? Rule 
6(2) of the ICSID Rules, which requires an arbitrator to sign a 
declaration setting out any “circumstance that might cause [his or 
her] reliability for independent judgment to be questioned by a 
party,” might be invoked in support of the idea that a “reasonable 
doubt” test would be appropriate.30 So too might the IBA’s 
Guidelines, which insist that in all arbitrations there should be an 
appearance test based on justifiable doubts as to the impartiality or 
independence of the arbitrator.31 The Guidelines hold that: 
Doubts are justifiable if a reasonable third person, having knowledge of 
the relevant facts and circumstances, would reach the conclusion that 
there is a likelihood that the arbitrator may be influenced by factors other 
than the merits of the case as presented by the parties in reaching his or 
her decision.32 
However, ICSID tribunals have adopted a stricter standard, 
moving away from a “reasonable doubt” test and towards a higher 
threshold “obvious appearance of bias” test. In the disqualification 
decision in Caratube International Oil Company v. Kazakhstan the 
remaining members upheld a disqualification claim against the 
arbitrator appointed by the Respondent.33 They did so because they 
were satisfied “that a third party would find that there is an evident 
UNCITRAL Rules]; 2017 SCC Rules, art. 19(1); LCIA Rules, supra note 13, art. 
10.1; AAA Int’l Rules, art. 14(1).  
 29.  ICSID Convention, art. 14, 57. 
 30.  International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes Rules for 
Arbitration Proceedings, art. 6(2) [hereinafter 2006 ICSID Rules]. 
 31.  IBA Guidelines, at Part I, § 2(b). 
 32.  Id. at Part I § 2(c). 
 33.  Caratube Int’l Oil Co. & Devinicci Salah Hourani v. Rep. of Kazakhstan, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, Award (Mar. 20, 2014).  
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or obvious appearance of lack of impartiality or independence based 
on a reasonable evaluation of the facts in the present case.”34 
While the rules seemingly give the ICSID arbitrator more leeway 
to be partial and dependent, a tribunal operating under the auspices 
of ICSID is in practice unlikely to be any less independent than a 
tribunal convened under another regime. An explanation for this is 
perhaps that the impartiality of party-appointed arbitrators is, to an 
extent, self-regulating.35 If arbitrators suspect a fellow arbitrator of 
being partisan, they are likely to receive their opinions in 
deliberations with suspicion and skepticism.36 Well-advised litigants 
are aware of this and tend to avoid the appointment of arbitrators 
with an obvious connection or who have strongly expressed 
preferences on matters that align with the party’s case. This means 
that arbitrators should avoid pigeonholing themselves on particular 
issues through their publications or aligning themselves too closely 
with one class of claimant. To do so could reduce an arbitrator’s 
prospects of appointment, or provide the other side with fodder in 
disqualification proceedings.37 
The rules and the jurisprudence discussed thus far apply equally to 
tribunal chairs, appointed by agreement or by an institution, and 
party-appointed arbitrators. There are of course practical differences 
in the expectations of the chair as opposed to the party-appointed 
arbitrator, which merit attention. These differences have come to 
light in cases before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in The 
Hague. Each of the panels in the Tribunal comprise a U.S. national, 
an Iranian national, and a chairman from a third country.38 Many 
 34.  Id. at 57.  
 35.  See Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A 
Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
53, 57 (2005) (referring to the earlier regime of arbitration when impartiality and 
independence was largely self-regulating).  
 36.  See Dominique Hascher, Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators: 3 
Issues, 27:4 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 789, 795-96 (2012) (explaining that when 
choosing an arbitrator, it is in the interest of each party to choose an arbitrator with 
the greatest predisposition towards the party, with the minimal outward appearance 
of bias). 
 37.  See 2006 ICSID Rules, at Rule 9. 
 38.  Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of 
Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United 
States of American and the Government of the Islamic republic of Iran (Claims 
Settlement Declaration) art. III, Jan. 19 1981, http://www.iusct.net/General% 
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litigants have adopted a shorthand for referring to the third-country 
chairmen as “the neutrals.”39 The implication this holds for the U.S. 
and Iranian nationals has been known to raise the ire of U.S. 
arbitrators, who consider themselves to be fully neutral, despite their 
nomination by the United States. 
Nevertheless, in some respects, I think it is useful to adopt 
different phraseology for the purpose of distinguishing between the 
expectations of the party-appointed arbitrator and the chair. In 
international commercial arbitration, the party-appointed arbitrator 
may serve as a translator of the legal culture, and occasionally the 
law itself, of the appointing party.40 This means that, within the 
bounds of the requirements of impartiality and independence, the 
party appointed arbitrator should not play a merely static role in the 
decision making process.41 He or she should not be biased or 
prejudiced in any way, but may be sympathetic to the arguments of 
the party that appointed him or her and may take steps to ensure that 
those arguments are fully understood and duly considered by the 
other tribunal members.42 In some respects, the role is not dissimilar 
to that of the judge ad hoc in proceedings before the ICJ. So long as 
any shared legal or cultural background with the appointing party 
does not override the arbitrator’s professional judgment, there can be 
no charge of partiality or dependence. 
In light of the foregoing, is it possible for today’s arbitrator to fill 
the shoes of the Grand Old Men? Is it a realistic proposition that an 
arbitrator could be considered independent and impartial by all 
observers in all fora? I think the answer is yes for the depleting 
minority, but no for the expanding majority. There still exists a small 
group, who rose to the top of their professions without specializing in 
arbitration, and who now serve as tribunal presidents on a part-time 
basis.43 To call them a mafia would be an exaggeration, but for these 
20Documents/2-Claims%20Settlement%20Declaration.pdf [hereinafter Claims 
Settlement Declaration]. 
 39.  RAHMATULLAH KHAN, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: 
CONTROVERSIES, CASES, AND CONTRIBUTION 259-60 (1990).  
 40.  Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International 
Controversies: Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 65 (1995). 
 41.  Id. at 68. 
 42.  Id. at 65. 
 43.  DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 4, at 21-22.  
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“neutrals,” there is little risk that their independence or impartiality 
will be jeopardized. 
For most practitioners, it is not so straightforward. It may only be 
possible to be impartial and independent when arbitrating for certain 
parties on specific cases. Arbitrators have to make their name in a 
competitive market, which involves developing an expertise and 
building a specific client base.44 The modern practitioner might one 
day act as counsel for a party in relation to a problem, the next day 
present an expert opinion on the same point, and the day after sit as 
an arbitrator in a case which raises the same issue. On day three, not 
only will the arbitrator be exhausted, but they may also fall foul of 
the applicable rules on independence and impartiality. These 
conflicts are part of the business of being a full time arbitrator, but 
they are not insuperable. For the contemporary arbitrator who seeks a 
diversity of work, one of the great challenges will be how to attract 
appointments from parties who want a sympathetic ear while not 
becoming typecast such that there exist doubts regarding impartiality 
or independence in particular types of dispute. 
III.THE TECHNOCRATS 
The second generation of arbitrators is known as the 
“Technocrats.” These are professional arbitrators who have dedicated 
most or all of their careers to the pursuit of arbitration in its various 
forms. The arrival of the technocrats was documented, somewhat 
critically, by Jan Paulsson in 1985, who said: 
The age of innocence has come to an end. . .the subject has inevitably lost 
some of its charm. Once the delightful discipline of a handful of academic 
aficionados on the fringe of international law, it has become a matter of 
serious concern for great numbers of professionals determined to master a 
process because it is essential to their business. They labor, but not for 
love.45 
Garth and Dezalay also describe the technocrats in somewhat 
unromantic terms – they are depicted as a fairly homogenous crowd 
who studied their art in institutions like the ICC or in dedicated 
 44.  Id. at 21-25 (explaining the various types of professionals who become 
arbitrators).   
 45.  Jan Paulsson, Introduction, 1 ARBITRATION INT’L 1, 2 (1985). 
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practice groups in major law firms.46 These comments were made 
approximately 30 and 20 years ago respectively, and one would think 
today that the group of professional commercial arbitrators is more 
diverse, owing to the need to compete in particular sectors, such as 
construction, services, finance or insurance. Dezalay and Garth also 
perhaps incorrectly assume that three-person tribunals in commercial 
arbitrations will exclusively comprise specialised lawyers. However, 
provided the chair is a lawyer, and hence able to drive the process 
from a procedural perspective, and assuming the legal questions are 
not overly complex, the remaining members need not be lawyers. We 
can draw from the example of WTO panellists, almost half of whom 
do not have law degrees.47 
The notion of the technocrat might not be transferrable to the 
investment treaty sphere – not least because the areas of legal 
knowledge required of the arbitrator are the subject of debate. At the 
time the ICSID Convention was being drafted, it was contemplated 
that causes of actions in disputes between investors and States would 
arise under contracts rather than treaties. Hence commercial 
arbitrators’ knowledge of how to set up and run ad hoc tribunals for 
sophisticated international contracts was foundational. It was not 
until the landmark ICSID decisions in Southern Pacific Properties v. 
Egypt48 in 1988 and Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka49 in 
1990 that investors started to access ISDS mechanisms through 
bilateral treaties. Since that time, more than 600 investor-State treaty 
arbitrations have been filed and more than 3,000 investment treaties 
are in force.50 As a consequence, the focus of the tribunal in investor-
 46.  See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 4, at 35-36 (describing the distinct 
professional characteristics of the “old guard” vis-à-vis the newcomers). 
 47.  See Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 763 (“[The WTO’s panelists are] 
predominantly diplomats or ex-diplomats, often without law degrees and mostly 
with relatively little experience.”). 
 48.  See S. Pac. Props. (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/84/3, Award, ¶ 1 (May, 20 1992) [hereinafter Middle East Ltd. v. 
Egypt].  
 49.  See Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/87/3, Award, ¶ 1 (June 27, 1990) [hereinafter APPL v. Sri Lanka]. 
 50.  E.g., Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Some facts and figures, 
EUR. COMM’N 3-5 (Mar. 12, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/ 
january/tradoc_153046.pdf [hereinafter ISDS Facts and Figures] (acknowledging 
that more than three thousand international investment agreements containing 
investor-to-state dispute settlement provisions exist today). 
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State arbitrations has shifted from contract to treaty interpretation.51 
The historical trend towards the international lawyer can also be 
gleaned from treaty language. The 1965 ICSID Convention requires 
arbitrators to have “recognized competence in the fields of law, 
commerce, industry or finance”52 while the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) requires 
arbitrators to have “demonstrated expertise in public international 
law” with a preference for expertise in “international investment law, 
in international trade law and the resolution of disputes arising under 
international investment or international trade agreements.”53 
The transition from private to public disputes does not mean, and 
should not mean, that the skills of international commercial 
arbitrators are no longer required. Investment arbitration is a hybrid. 
Generally public international law governs the dispute and provides 
the applicable law.54 On the other hand, the procedural law derives 
predominantly from international commercial arbitration, which has 
been profoundly influenced by the principles of equality of arms and 
procedural fairness.55 There has in this sense been a grafting of both 
regimes. In Anthea Roberts’ words: 
The unique marriage of public international law as the applicable law with 
dispute resolution rules resembling those in international commercial 
arbitration means that the field was historically populated by two very 
different professional communities: one from the side of public 
international law and interstate dispute resolution, and the other from the 
side of private law and commercial arbitration.56 
 51.  E.g., id. at 6 (listing the sixty cases of the Energy Charter Treaty, the fifty-
three cases with the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the seventeen 
cases with the Argentina-US Bilateral Investment Treaty). 
 52.  ICSID Convention, art. 14. 
 53.  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between 
Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the 
other part, OJ L 11, 14.1.2017, pp. 23–1079  [hereinafter CETA]. 
 54.  See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies 
Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 45 (2013) 
(observing that investment treaties are creatures of public international law, and are 
substantively governed by public international law). 
 55.  See id. at 55 (citing Wälde’s conclusion that the international commercial 
arbitration approach to the treatment of state prevails because equality of arms is a 
foundational principle of investment arbitration procedure). 
 56.  Id. at 54. 
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While the two fields do co-exist in some tension, even to the point 
of an occasional skirmish, I would not go so far as to call it a 
“veritable culture clash.”57 Lawyers operate across a spectrum, and 
that is true of international commercial arbitrators, as it is of public 
international lawyers. Public international lawyers need above all to 
be flexible, and to incorporate the learning of private international 
lawyers in their own field, just as the reverse may be true. 
Differences in approach arise not only because commercial 
arbitrators and international lawyers draw from different sources of 
law, but also because their training and experience give them a 
different outlook on the role of the actors in a dispute.58 A 
commercial arbitration approach to investment disputes, pursuant to 
the equality of arms principle, conceives of the investor and State as 
equal disputing parties.59 A public international law approach looks 
first and foremost to the relationship of the States party to the treaty 
as the principal subjects of international law.60 This approach was 
evident in Loewen Group v. United States,61 in which the tribunal 
viewed the position of the claimant as being in some respects 
derivative of the State in which it was incorporated. While there is an 
apparent clash of paradigms, it can be resolved if arbitrators 
distinguish between the substantive regulatory interests involved and 
the procedural rights of the parties. Investment arbitration allows for 
insights from the two fields to be combined and we should be open 
to this mixing of ideas rather than treating it as a source of chaos or 
division. 
One area in which there has been something of a philosophical 
clash between the public and the private conception of the State 
 57.  See id. (explaining the two historically different professional communities 
populating the international commercial arbitration field resulting in the culture 
clash).  
 58.  Id., at 54 (noting the difference in approach, simplification, and 
stereotyping involved in generalizations influenced by arbitrators’ backgrounds, 
training, and interests). 
 59.  See id. at 55 (recognizing that an approach to treatment of states in 
international arbitration is equality of arms, and that tribunals should not give defer 
to states’ preferences unless clearly required by the governing law). 
 60.  See id. at 54 (analyzing the public international law paradigm’s focus on 
treaty bias as “putting the treaty parties in a position of relative superiority to both 
investors”). 
 61.  ICSID Case No. ARB/98/3, Award, ¶ 233 (June 26, 2003), http://www. 
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0470.pdf. 
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concerns the degree of deference that should be afforded to a host 
State. In the SD Myers62 arbitration the tribunal resolved that Canada 
had failed to accord the claimant fair and equitable treatment under 
Article 1105 of NAFTA by banning the export of waste products to 
the U.S. for disposal. In so doing, the tribunal noted that it had 
considered “the high measure of deference that international law 
generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate 
matters within their own borders.”63 The acceptance of a standard of 
review in SD Myers was relied upon by the U.S. in the Glamis Gold64 
arbitration to defend claims that it had denied the claimant fair and 
equitable treatment of its gold mine in California. The tribunal 
“disagree[d] that domestic deference in national court systems is 
necessarily applicable to international tribunals”65 and said that the 
idea of deference is already found in the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment codified in Article 1105, which 
requires a gross denial of justice or manifest arbitrariness.66 
The melting pot of legal influences in investment treaty arbitration 
has been the subject of criticism on the grounds that it results in 
inconsistent case law; a fragmentation of the system.67 But each case 
is decided on its own merits; while it is possible to find 
inconsistencies between some cases, this is not unusual in the 
discipline of law. Integration is a concept taken from domestic legal 
systems and improperly imposed in the international sphere. It 
presupposes that one particular legal paradigm is the right way to 
determine investment treaty disputes, whereas arbitrators may need 
to look for different techniques for different sorts of cases. The field 
is relatively new and is still working out the best approaches to 
particular problems. To yield to the pressure of the integrationists 
 62.  S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award (NAFTA Arb. 2000), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0747.pdf.  
 63.  Id. ¶ 263. 
 64.  Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, ICSID, Award (June 8, 2009), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0378.pdf.   
 65.  Id. ¶ 617.  
 66.  Id. ¶¶ 616. 
 67.  See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1546 (2005) (“The increase in the number of 
investment arbitrations and the tactical structuring of investments to create claims 
under multiple investment treaties increased the likelihood of inconsistent 
decisions.”). 
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would be to prefer one approach and to disregard other competing 
ideas. At this point in the lifecycle of investment arbitration the 
integrationist approach risks damaging the development of the 
field.68 
For these reasons, there can be no ideal arbitrator. To the contrary, 
tribunals that comprise a diversity of legal backgrounds – appropriate 
to the nature of the dispute – will tend to produce better-reasoned 
decisions. I think there are lessons to be learnt from the way private 
parties might construct a bespoke panel based on the nature of their 
dispute. Investor-State parties should give thought to whether a 
tribunal constituted of arbitrators with different legal backgrounds 
might be better suited to the resolution of their dispute rather than a 
straight hand of commercial arbitrators or a single species of 
international lawyer. 
IV. THE MANAGERS 
In 2012, Schultz and Kovacs69 sought to introduce a third 
generation of arbitrators – the “Managers.” Under this banner, they 
grouped three sets of capabilities – the management of proceedings, 
the management of deliberations of the tribunal, and the management 
of the organisation of the work within the tribunal.70 These all imply 
a fairly high measure of delegation,71 something which was 
previously regarded as being somewhat improper. It is unsurprising 
that management skills are an important factor in the appointment of 
arbitrators; but it might be going too far to suggest that the present 
generation of arbitrators is defined by this unifying characteristic. 
Management abilities are an important part of any arbitrator’s 
arsenal, but it would be a sad indictment on the profession if they 
were the distinguishing feature; the mark that separated the arbitrator 
from his or her contemporaries. 
That said, the importance of management skills to clients in 
private disputes does highlight a gap – hopefully, a closing one – 
between how commercial arbitrators and international lawyers 
 68.  James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 24 ARB. 
INT’L 351 (2014). 
 69.  Schultz & Kovacs, supra note 6.  
 70.  Id. at 170. 
 71.  Id.  
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manage the procedural side of investment treaty arbitrations. In my 
experience, commercial arbitrators are better at managing the 
discovery process – including challenges to the adequacy of 
discovery and requests for the further production of documents. They 
are more practised at dealing with requests for confidentiality orders. 
And, unlike some international lawyers who adhere to the maxim 
judex non calculate, they are also more comfortable engaging with 
the quantification of damages, including supervising the cross-
examination of quantum experts. 
It should also be noted that the quality of an arbitrator lies not just 
in his or her capacity to do these things, but in being able to strike the 
right balance of robustly addressing unnecessary procedural 
diversions while ensuring the arbitral process delivers a fair result to 
the parties. 
V. THE MANAGED 
This section considers the European Commission’s proposal for an 
international investment court system.72 The proposal suffered a 
setback when negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) – which was to contain the lodestar for the 
investment court proposal – was described as “de facto dead” by 
Germany’s Economy Minister in late 2016.73 Whilst the TTIP might 
be dead, the same cannot be said for the investment court proposal. 
The Commission is introducing facets of its proposal into free trade 
agreements – including CETA, which was signed on 30 October 
2016 – as stepping-stones towards the establishment of a permanent 
multilateral investment court. 
• The features of the proposed permanent investment court remain 
somewhat vague, but clues are apparent from the architecture of 
new bilateral tribunals in CETA and TTIP.74 The features 
 72.  See The Multilateral Investment Court Project, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Dec. 
21, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608.  
 73.  EU-U.S. Trade Talks Seem Unbalanced, May Need Pause: Belgian PM, 
REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2016, 9:54 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-usa-
trade-belgium-idUSKCN1190L0 (reporting that the French trade minister Matthias 
Fekl requested to halt talks at a European Union trade ministers meeting after the 
German economy minister Sigmar Gabriel declared the talks to be “de facto 
dead”). 
 74.  Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, E.U.-U.S., art. 9, draft of 
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include:the pre-appointment of 15 arbitrators for multi-year year 
terms,75 comprising one third EU nationals, one third U.S. or 
Canadian nationals, and one third nationals of other States.76 
Appointees are required to “possess the qualifications required in 
their respective countries for appointment to judicial office, or be 
jurists of recognised competence.”77 Appointees must have a 
“demonstrated expertise in public international law” and it is 
desirable that they have expertise “in international investment 
law, international trade law and the resolution of disputes arising 
under international investment or international trade 
agreements;”78 
• the establishment of an appellate tribunal, with power to uphold, 
modify, or reverse decisions by the first instance tribunal for 
errors of law and manifest errors of fact;79 
• the ability for States to recommend agreed interpretations on 
CETA or TTIP, which are binding on the tribunal, even in 
respect of ongoing cases;80 and 
• codes of conduct for arbitrators, including rules to guarantee 
impartiality and independence that are stricter than those found in 
the UNCITRAL Rules or the ICSID Convention or Rules. This 
includes a series of rules proscribing members from incurring an 
obligation or benefit, or from entering into a relationship or 
acquiring a financial benefit, that would interfere with their 
duties or which might reasonably create an appearance of bias.81 
In my view, this structure risks turning the “Managers” of today 
into the “Managed” of tomorrow. First, the structure entirely 
agreement, July 31, 2015, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_ 
153669.pdf [hereinafter TTIP Working Draft] (establishing the responsibilities of 
the tribunal created by Article 6 of the TTIP). 
 75.  See CETA, art. 8.27(5) (establishing five year terms for the 15 member 
tribunal); see also TTIP Working Draft, §3(4) art. 9 (stating the terms of the 15 
appointed judges to be six years). 
 76.  CETA, art. 8.27(2); TTIP Working Draft, §3(4) art. 9(2); TTIP Working 
Draft, supra note 74, §3(4) art. 9(2). 
 77.  CETA, art. 8.27(4); TTIP Working Draft, §3(4) art. 9(4). 
 78.  CETA, art. 8.27(4); TTIP Working Draft, §3(4) art. 9(4). 
 79.  CETA, art. 8.28(2); TTIP Working Draft, §3(4) art. 10. 
 80.  CETA, art. 8.31(3); TTIP Working Draft, §3(5) art. 13(5). 
 81.  CETA, Annex 29B, Code of Conduct, art. 12 & 15; TTIP Working Draft, 
Annex II, Code of Conduct, art. 5.  
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removes powers of appointment from investors. Instead, States will 
unilaterally appoint their own arbitrators in the same way that 
executive governments appoint national judges in most domestic 
legal systems. This is something the international lawyer could be 
comfortable with, as we are used to lobbying for the support of 
governments, but it might not sit so easily with the commercial 
arbitrator.  While a number of European States, including France and 
Germany, have been flexible in reforming their domestic legal 
systems to allow for the interaction of commercial arbitration 
tribunals and municipal courts, the EU’s approach to the investment 
court has clearly been one of more rigidity. As the disputes before 
the investment court will involve substantive claims against 
governments, the EU and the US and Canada are more cautious to 
exercise control over the type of decision-maker appointed and have 
unsurprisingly mandated the selection of arbitrators with qualities 
and qualifications that the States know and trust. As observed by 
Pauwelyn, the same sensitivities have driven States to appoint WTO 
panellists from among former diplomats, which is another group that 
is understood and deemed reliable by governments.82 But while this 
approach may be appropriate in the WTO context, which addresses 
inter-State disputes concerning systemic problems in the flow of 
trade, it does not follow that it should be transplanted to disputes 
between investors and States, which largely relate to the State’s 
treatment of a private actor. 
Removing the agency of the investor from the appointment of 
arbitrators could pose challenges to the independence of arbitrators 
in favour of the State. The judicial criteria exacerbate this risk. The 
majority of ICSID investment treaty arbitrators come from private 
law firms.83 Yet if we look at the types of people appointed as judges 
across both civil and common law systems, they do not tend to be 
partners in firms – rather, they are prominent counsel, government 
lawyers or career judges.84 Imposing such criteria will exclude a 
 82.  Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 772 (observing 57 percent of panelists were 
Geneva-based diplomats at some point in their career).  
 83.  See José Augusto Fontoura Costa, Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID 
Arbitrators: The Creation of International Legal Fields, 1(4) OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL 
SERIES 1, 23 (2011) (explaining that in ICSID the most common background is 
private sector (76%) followed by academia and in third place government service).  
 84.  See id.  
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proportion of investment arbitrators from consideration. Those 
excluded will include lawyers from the ranks of the Grand Old Men, 
the Technocrats, and the Managers. Thus, while the judicial criteria 
will no doubt result in the appointment of strong decision-makers, it 
may result in tribunals of monochromatic experience and uniform 
views. 
Second, the power of States to impose binding interpretations on 
treaty provisions – even mid-dispute – increases the risk that 
arbitrators will preference legal principles familiar or favourable to 
States.85 The pressure this power imposes on the arbitrator largely 
obviates impartiality protections like fixed terms or disclosure 
requirements. 
Third, the appointment criteria restrict candidates to those with an 
expertise in public international law, with a preference for a 
specialisation in one of a number of relevant areas.86 This criterion is 
short-sighted for two principal reasons. First, it offers no guarantee 
of diversity within the corpus of public international lawyers. 
Hypothetically, every appointee could be a trade lawyer with no 
expertise in investment law. It also excludes arbitrators with 
experience in different legal areas, like commercial arbitration and 
public law. Investor-State arbitration is a relatively new phenomenon 
and, like all goods and services, it benefits from a free market of 
competing ideas.  The investment court proposal risks marginalising 
valuable ideas from different systems of law. 
Finally, the code of conduct, while a good idea in principle, risks 
excluding a number of candidates who, by virtue of their practice, 
may be deemed to have too many potential conflicts of interest.87 
 85.  See CETA, art. 8.31(3) (“An interpretation adopted by the CETA Joint 
Committee shall be binding on the Tribunal established under this Section.”); see 
also TTIP Working Draft, §3(5) art. 13(5) (stating the Committee may adopt 
decisions interpreting the related provisions of the Agreement, and such 
interpretation is binding on the Tribunal and Appeal Tribunal). 
 86.  See CETA, art. 8.27(4) (stating members of the tribunal shall be public 
international law experts); see also TTIP Working Draft, §3(4), art. 9(4) (asserting 
judges shall possess expertise in public international law). 
 87.  See CETA, Annex 29B, Code of Conduct, arts. 12 & 15 (requiring 
arbitrators to remain independent and impartial, and avoid entering into 
relationships, incurring benefits, obligations, or any financial interests that would 
adversely interfere or influence with her or his proper performance of duties or 
impartiality); see also TTIP Working Draft, Annex II, Code of Conduct, art. 5 
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While impartiality and independence requirements prevent 
practitioners from participating in ad hoc arbitrations from time to 
time, in the context of a permanent tribunal, designed to operate to 
the exclusion of ad hoc arbitrations for EU States, the consequences 
are much more severe. 
The consequences of the EU investment court proposal remain to 
be seen. CETA has been concluded but is yet to enter into force. It is 
for investors to decide whether suits will be brought before an 
investment court, not States. It may well be that the investment court 
is brought into existence, but that investors opt to use other forums 
open to them, including ad hoc tribunals. 
This article addresses the ways in which the field of arbitrators has 
become more diversified. The investment court proposal deliberately 
attempts to reverse this trend, based on perceived shortcomings in 
the current investment treaty arbitration system. Offering a quasi-
judicial alternative to arbitration is not necessarily negative – but 
replacing it entirely for EU States risks narrowing the field of 
potential arbitrators to the detriment of the enterprise. The fallacy 
underlying the EU proposal is that it assumes not only that there is an 
ideal arbitrator, but that each State has five of them. 
 
(mandating arbitrators to maintain impartiality and independence). 
 
